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Abstract: Modern political interaction is characterized by strong partisanship and
a lack of interest in information sharing and agreement across party lines. It remains
largely unclear how such partisan echo chambers arise and how they coevolve with
opinion formation. Here we explore the emergence of these structures through the
lens of coevolutionary games. In our model, the payoff of an individual is determined
jointly by the magnitude of their opinion, their degree of conformity with their social
neighbors, and the benefit of having social connections. Each individual can simul-
taneously adjust their opinion as well as the weights of their social connections. We
present and validate the conditions for the emergence of partisan echo chambers,
characterizing the transition from cohesive communities with consensus to divisive
networks with splitting opinions. Moreover, we apply our model to voting records
of the United States House of Representatives over a timespan of decades in order to
understand the influence of underlying psychological and social factors on increasing
partisanship in recent years. Our work helps elucidate how the division of today has
come to be and how cohesion and unity could otherwise be attained on a variety of
political and social issues.
Key words: polarization, consensus, social dynamics
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a political context of growing partisanship and echo chamber formation, a natural question is
how such a culture of division arose and what might be to come in the future if the trend continues.
In order to address this question using an opinion formation model, it is necessary to take into
account both the underlying motives of an individual’s actions and also his or her position in the
socio-political milieu. This environment consists of all the influences on that individual: his or
her sources of information and the social pressures that he or she feels to conform to one view or
another. Network science offers the theoretical basis for the quantification and description of these
factors, and provides metrics for the modular structure implied by “echo chambers” and partisan
politics.
Over the past decades, making use of the extensive available data, researchers have been able
to identify some common topological characteristics of social networks. For example, social net-
works are frequently found to be highly heterogenous with the small-world property [1, 2]. In the
broader biological context, high degree nodes have been shown to play an essential role in pro-
moting network robustness and increasing the efficiency of communication and flow through the
network [1, 3]. Furthermore, biological networks frequently exhibit organization into clustered
communities of nodes (often referred to as modules), the recognition of which is in itself a topic of
study [4–6]. This line of research is in parallel with more theoretical considerations of how large
networks can be categorized and described [7–12].
The discovery of these network topological features begs the question of how they influence
the dynamics taking place on the network. Concerning opinion dynamics specifically, how does
the network structure of a group of individuals change the way in which those individuals develop
their own beliefs? Previous studies of opinion dynamics have explored population structures with
the general characteristics of social networks with an emphasis on refining the opinion updating
procedures employed by individual nodes in the network [13–22].
Most recently, the coevolution of opinion dynamics and individual social connections has re-
ceived increasing attention [23–26]. In these models, Individuals modify their interactions with
those who chronically disagree with them, usually with the purpose of avoiding discussion of the
topics which arouse contention. Building on this prior work, we investigate opinion formation
on dynamic social network through the lens of a coevolutionary game [27]. The relevant struc-
tural information of the network includes the opinions of the individuals in the network and the
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relative influence that each individual exercises on his or her neighbors, concepts which can be
understood as values attached to the nodes and to the edges, respectively. This paper will consider
how individuals’ opinions change alongside the structure of the network in which they are embed-
ded, taking as a basic assumption that the two are fundamentally linked and that they mutually
influence each others’ evolution. Development of this kind can lead to complex structure within
the network, an excellent example of which are the idealistically divided sub-communities that
develop in the political sphere, from democrats and republicans [28, 29] to pro-vaccination and
anti-vaccination groups [30].
Improving our understanding of opinion evolution is essential in the context of modern poli-
tics. Partisanship has come to dominate the political sphere, both amongst the political elite and
the general population[28, 29, 31–33], stalling political consensus on issues that demand rapid
decision-making. It has become a major research concern to effectively understand circumstances
that will lead to convergence of opinion and others that will lead to divergence of opinion and a
weakening of information transfer [34]. The model and methods provided in this work allow for
the analysis of the current state of politics and the partial elucidation of how the division of today
has came to be.
II. MODEL
Let us denote by X the vector of opinions of all nodes in the network, where Xi refers to the
belief of the ith node. The values of the Xi are allowed to range in the interval [−1, 1], where neg-
ative values indicate disagreement and positive values denote agreement with a given proposition.
Greater magnitudes indicate stronger opinions. Let C represent the weighted adjacency matrix
of the network, composed of the weights on the connections between any pair of two nodes in
the network, with Ci j referring to the connection between the ith node and the jth node. For the
purpose of our model, the connections between nodes are considered to be symmetrical, meaning
that Ci j = C ji. The value of Ci j can range between zero and one, where zero indicates that there is
no connection between i and j and one indicates the strongest possible tie between the two.
The payoff (= fitness) of a node in the network is determined as the sum of three different
factors: the strength of the node’s opinion, the node’s level of agreement with neighboring nodes
in the network (nodes with which the node in question has a non-zero connection), and the degree
of the node (the total sum of the weights of the node’s connections). The importance of each of
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these three components is described by the parameter α, β, and γ, respectively.
For a network of size N, the fitness of an individual node i is given by:
fi(X,C) = α|Xi| + β
∑
i, j
Ci, jXiX j + γ
∑
i, j
Ci, j (1)
The first and third terms of the fitness function are the benefits for a greater magnitude of opin-
ion and more connection with neighboring nodes respectively and their forms are self-explanatory.
For a given node, the second term sums over all other nodes in the network, determining the cogni-
tive dissonance accrued by interaction with each of them [35, 36]. Note that where Xi and X j are of
opposite sign, meaning that the nodes i and j disagree, their contribution to the second term of the
fitness function will be negative. Thus disagreeing nodes incur a penalty. The penalty is scaled by
the strength of the connection between the two nodes, as the effects of cognitive dissonance will be
most pronounced when there is a strong influence between individuals, thus making contradictory
opinions harder to ignore.
The purpose of our model is to understand the behavior of an opinion network given a set of
initial conditions including the starting connections between nodes of the network, the initial be-
liefs of the nodes in the network, and the parameters of the fitness function. The coevolution of
network connections and opinions is achieved through an iterative process of mutation (perturba-
tion) that amounts to a simplified genetic algorithm: changes are made to both connection and
opinion values in the network during each iteration, with predetermined step-sizes. At each step,
only those changes that improve the fitness of the network are kept (see details in the Methods
section). Over many iterations, these random mutations improve the network, leading ultimately
to a resting stable state.
III. RESULTS
Let us start with qualitatively understanding the long term coevolutionary dynamics of net-
work connections and individual opinions. We make the assumption that the nodes’ initial beliefs
are distributed randomly over the full range of beliefs and that there exists no initial bias on the
connections between node (nodes of similar opinions are not already clustered for instance). As
shown in Eq (1), the fitness function of an individual i can be improved unilaterally by increasing
the magnitude of its opinion Xi, regardless of their network connections. This suggests that indi-
viduals tend to adopt extreme opinions, either +1 or −1 in the long term, and the direction will be
5
determined by the initial configurations within their local neighborhoods.
Furthermore, taking the partial derivatives of fi with respect to Ci j, we obtain
∂ fi(X,C)
∂Ci, j
= βXiX j + γ. (2)
We find that node i is likely to increase the strength of its connection to node j, if XiX j >
−γ/β. Similarly we find that node i tends to increase its magnitude of opinion, if ∑ X jCi, j >
− sign(Xi)α/β. In particular, for β > γ, nodes with opposite views are much likely to become
disconnected, and hence the resulting network tends to divide into with two echo chambers with
splitting views. In order to illustrate these effects, we turn to computer simulations to study how
the long-term behavior of the network depends on the parameters β and γ (see Methods).
Figure 1 demonstrates that the parameter choices of β and γ mainly drive the coevolutionary
dynamics of opinion and networks. Figure 1a and 1b reflect what can happen when β is dominant
rather than γ. There is an initial stage of divergence, but in this case it reduces overtime. As the
value of maintaining connections is lower than it was for the convergent network, the relationships
between nodes that disagree quickly deteriorate, leaving entirely separate populations. In this final
state, the nodes in the network have no cognitive dissonance. Their opinions are entirely aligned
with those of the other nodes present in their local community. We can relate this scenario to the
real-world phenomena of political echo chambers. People with similar opinions group together to
the extent that they never hear opinions differing from their own.
Figure 1c and 1d show that cohesive communities with consensus of opinion can be obtained
for fixed α and β < γ. In this case, there is often an initial phase in which opinions become more
extreme on both sides of the argument, but then are turned around such that the network converges
to consensus (Fig. 1d). This apparent change in opinion is a result of the co-evolving network
structure, which at the turn around point has created sufficient connections between individuals that
do not agree, such that there is greater benefit to moving toward the same opinion than otherwise
(Fig. 1c). With γ higher, however, the likelihood of connection overwhelming initial extremism
is higher as early on, more connections are formed. We might expect such an arrangement in
the real world in the case of family members: here it is difficult to rapidly change the level of
communication with other individuals on a given topic but there is still benefit to maintaining
cognitive consistency. We would expect this to promote the ultimate convergence of opinions in
the local network at least.
To help gain a complete picture of these results, we perform comprehensive simulations across
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the parameter space (γ, β), as shown in Fig. 2. This illustrates some of the intuition that might be
gained from the analytical solutions for the behavior of a single node. Where β exceeds γ, it is
generally expected that there will be division for example, and this is indeed what we see in the
plot (Fig. 2a and 2b). Where β is small, it is expected that there will be division of opinion, but
with a reasonable level of connections in the network. These are the cases located near the bottom
of the plot (Fig. 2a). Interestingly, the divisions between these critical regions are not perfect; there
are sprays of random model runs on both sides of the various divides in the plot which defy the
expectation given the parameter values. Over many runs, we use these values to form a plot of the
variance across the parameter space as in Fig. 2b.
As revealed by our sensitivity analysis (Fig. 2a and 2b), besides entirely split networks and
fully connected networks (Fig. 1), it is possible to have sub-community formation with multiple
levels of inter-group connections (Fig. 2c and 2d). Indeed this is what we find in the case of the
U.S House of Representatives voting records [37]: there is rarely complete consensus or complete
division.
We can understand these simulation results intuitively as follows. The α and β terms tend to
drive the network opinions apart and the connections between them to zero, whereas γ term tends
to pull the network together. The specific parameter choices determine the balance between these
two forces, and therefore can lead to a variety of typical behaviors of the co-evolutionary dynamics
of opinions and networks (Fig. 1 and 2). It should be noted that the influence of the initial structure
of the network on its final state may be drastic. There exist cases in which the initial structure of the
network, due to the random initialization used, biases the behavior of the network to such a great
extent that it reverses what would have happened in a graph without any such bias. In particular
these might be cases where by chance a random division in the connections of the network is
aligned with the divisions in the opinions of the nodes. This might lead to division in the network
regardless of the ratio between the parameters β and γ. Alternatively there may be a case in which
there is strong initial connection between nodes of different opinions, promoting the development
of consensus where they might normally have been division.
There may also be initial biases, arising from the random initialization by chance, in the dis-
tributions of the opinions of the nodes. If the belief values chosen are particularly skewed to one
side, even where the values are within their prescribed positive or negative ranges, it may be the
case that the the nodes will reach consensus when the parameters would normally have induced
division. Similarly, a distribution of beliefs that contains only extreme opinions to begin with may
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stay that way even if the parameters might have predicted consensus. It is notable that the model
does not allow people to hold on to weak opinion values for very long. Even for weak α values,
once groups are somewhat separated, the β term leads to a mutual reinforcement of opinion be-
tween nodes. The greater the magnitudes of the beliefs of the nodes in question, the larger the β
term can become, benefiting both of the nodes in question.
As a real-world application of our model, we use voting records of the United States House of
Representatives over a timespan of decades [37], in order to understand the influence of underly-
ing psychological and social factors on increasing partisanship in recent years. This dataset has
been previously considered as an excellent example for the measurement of network division over
time [37]. House members were considered to have a positive belief level if they identified with
the Democrats and negative belief level if they were Republican. While party affiliation clearly
encompasses a broad range of beliefs, we take it as a proxy for belief on a particular topic.
Figure 3 shows the calculated division values for different trial years, which span over the
last five decades (each year indicating a session of the House of Representatives), along with the
inferred model parameter ratio β/γ. Figure 4 shows network snapshots over time that are generated
by our model with best-fitted parameter values. We found evidence to support that the relative
emphases of opinion conformity (represented by β) and general connection (represented by γ) have
been changing over time. Over this time period, we can see that both network division values and
the ratio of β and γ have first experienced decreases followed by dramatic increases. In particular,
recent years see a clear growth in the level of division, which along with a commensurate growth in
β/γ, suggests a shift in priority from connection to congruity of opinion. These results demonstrate
that our model and specifically the parameters of the fitness function can be used as a way to
understand changes in opinion networks over time. Greater network division can be modeled as a
growth in the value of local homogeneity of opinion as compared to the general value placed on
connections with other nodes.
IV. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
Our model provides a method for the simulation of changing opinions on a network, allowing
for the co-evolution of opinions and the connections between nodes. We have shown that it is
possible to influence the final shape of a network through the modification of a fitness function
based on the minimization of cognitive dissonance. Example runs of the model have demonstrated
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that the initial distribution of the nodes in the network and of their opinions can tip the balance of
cases where the parameters of the fitness function does not strongly promote division or cohesion
in the final network, but that the behavior of the networks can be connected to those parameter
values in intuitive ways.
The current model allows for the simultaneous evolution of both the connections between the
nodes and their individual opinions. The purpose of the evolution is to maximize the fitness of
the network, where the definition of fitness includes the effects of cognitive dissonance, node de-
gree, and opinion magnitude. This is in line with other models that have considered the interplay
between individual forces acting on a given node and the combined forces of other nodes in the
network. [38] The resulting formulation is reminiscent of a spin-glass model, but is not equiva-
lent (See Castellano for a review of spin-glass models and similar constructions [39]). Cognitive
dissonance is defined as the discomfort felt by an individual who holds two competing opinions
at the same time. The discomfort it produces prompts individuals to avoid cases where they are
confronted with ideas that do not match their own [22, 35, 36, 40]. This brings out the primary as-
sumption of this paper: people do not form their opinions based on evidence, but rather choose the
opinions that they hold and the individuals with whom they surround themselves for the purpose
of maximizing fitness as we have defined it.
An application of our model to partisanship in the United States House of Representatives sug-
gests that it is possible to estimate the fitness function parameters for a real-world network and
that the results are logically connected to the meaning of the different parameters. The case study
points to a growth in the importance of homophily at the expense of having fewer connections in
American politics. The result is greater partisanship and polarization, and has been widely docu-
mented [28]. The fitness function forces changes in the network that ultimately lead to clustering
of those nodes who share the same opinions and a division of the network into mutually disaf-
fected populations. This structure mimics that of ”echo chambers” in the media and in politics,
and is self-reinforcing. If this trend continues, we are likely to see only greater political division
in the future rather than a return toward greater cohesion. While some variety is necessary for
effective problem-solving, it is concerning to think that politics may become so divided that no
compromises can be reached on even the most important questions. Data sets pertaining to chang-
ing social networks and the flow of information through them have become significantly easier
to access in recent decades with the advent of the Internet and large-scale social networking sites
[4, 41, 42]. The modeling of Twitter or Facebook networks as they change in time can be, for
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instance, another natural application of this research.
The importance of the underlying substrate topology has been demonstrated clearly for the
prisoner’s dilemma and similar games [43–45]. We find that the same is true of opinion dynamics.
Initial conditions can heavily influence the final behavior of a given network. One of the funda-
mental assumptions of this paper was that individuals choose their opinions and their connections
only to avoid disagreement with their neighbors in the social network. This is indeed enough to
create structure in the network similar to the structures that we see played out in real world social
networks, but it does also beg the question of where the validity of a particular opinion actually
comes into play. When does the evidence start to matter in the formation of opinions? Further
research should consider the interplay between logical evidence and the influence of other individ-
uals through the medium of cognitive dissonance. A model able to combine these two components
effectively would be much more complete and more accurate in the prediction of future states of a
given network of opinion. Future research will also consider the application of multiple levels of
opinion, delving into the world of belief ”systems” in contrast to single beliefs [21].
V. METHODS
A. Simulation procedure
Summing over all of the nodes, we have f (X,C) =
∑N
i=1 fi as the total fitness function for the
entire network. Expanding this quantity we have:
f (X,C) =
N∑
i=1
(
α|Xi| + β
∑
i, j
Ci, jXiX j + γ
∑
i, j
Ci, j
)
(3)
The quantity f (X,C) is used as a measure of the progress of the network as a whole toward the
steady state solution. Any possible improvements to f (X,C) eventually become more and more
rare as the network approaches a steady state, and so the rate of actual change of f with respect to
each iteration of the model decreases.
Specifically, the update step of the model consists of two rounds of random changes to the
network, first to the connections and then to the beliefs of the nodes. The number of connections
that are changed and the number of beliefs that are changed can be manipulated. The case for
which only one node is changed at a time is similar to a Moran process [46], and a change of all
of the nodes during each step would be akin to a Wright-Fisher update process [47]. The changes
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in this model are not made with either of these update processes explicitly, however. Each round
includes a validation stage which ensures that the changes made have improved the fitness of the
nodes in the network. Where there is no change or negative change to the fitness of a node, the
corresponding mutation is removed and the state of that node variable is reset to its value at the
end of the last iteration. The maximum value of a mutation can also be manipulated, but remains
fixed throughout the course of the model run. This is particularly useful for the exploration of
edge cases where mutations of either the connections or the beliefs of the nodes approach zero, at
which point the connections or beliefs are fixed.
We take Xi(t) to denote the belief of the ith node at time t and X′i (t) as the state after mutation in
time step t. By the same token Ci j and C′i j are the values of the connection between the ith and jth
nodes at time t and the their mutated values. Let ∆Xi indicate the mutation in the belief of the ith
node while ∆Ci j indicates the mutation of the connection between the ith and jth nodes. The value
of this mutation is pulled from a uniform distribution in the range [−.001, .001]. We then have the
following as the update rule for each of the nodes in the network:
X′i (t) = Xi(t) + ∆Xi (4)
Xt+1 :=

X′i (t) fi(X
′(t),C(t)) ≥ fi(X(t),C(t))
Xi(t) fi(X′(t),C(t)) < fi(X(t),C(t))
(5)
Similarly for the connections between nodes we have the following update rule (with mutations
in the range [−.0001, .0001]):
C′i j(t) = Ci j(t) + ∆Ci j (6)
Ci j(t + 1) :=

C′i j(t) fi(X(t),C
′(t)) ≥ fi(X(t),C(t))
Ci j(t) fi(X(t),C′(t)) < fi(X(t),C(t))
(7)
In MATLAB, the above update rules are enacted as matrix operations, with a vector of mu-
tations being added to X and then validated, while a matrix of changes is added to C before
validation.
Eventually this process brings the network to a steady state solution where neither the opinions
of the nodes nor the connections between them can be changed in a way that is beneficial to the
nodes of the network.
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Network division
In order to compare the final states of the networks produced by the model, we introduce
a simple metric for network division, which we define as the degree to which two groups are
disconnected in a network. The two groups in the case of opinion dynamics will be those who
agree and those who disagree. The sums of the weights on connections between nodes of the same
type (denoted I) and the weight on connections between nodes of different types (denoted O) are
calculated. The value of network division is then calculated to be II+O . For convenience, we define
networks where all nodes converge to the same belief value as having network division values of
0. Where there are only connections in the network between nodes of the same type, the value of
network division will be 1. Partially split networks will have values less than 1, but greater than 0
where there are any in-group connections at all. Network division will be equal to zero in the case
of a bipartite graph, where there are only intergroup connections.
Model-data integration
In applying this model to data concerning voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, we
calculate the division value using the average number of times that individuals voted together. The
in-group connections for democrats becomes the number of democrats for a given year multiplied
by the average number of democrat-democrat voting pairs, with a similar construction applied
to the republican members. The total in-group connections I is defined as the sum of these two
products. The out-group connections O is defined as the average number of democrat-republican
pairs multiplied with the total number of members. A network division value for each session of
the House of Representatives can then be calculated using the formula described above.
As a simplifying assumption, we take the beliefs of the individuals of congress to be steady, and
fix the value of α at 0.5. Theoretically, the parameter α should have no effect in this scenario, as
taking the partial derivative of the fitness function with respect to the connections between nodes
entirely removes the first term.
We wished to find the β/γ values that would produce these same values of network division in
a similar network. We begin with a population of nodes that had the same ratio of “democrats”
to “republicans”, meaning nodes with positive or negative belief values, as was found in a given
session of the House of Representatives. We then ran the model on this network for 40 different
12
ratios of β/γ for each session. Performing a linear regression on the resultant set of data points,
we gain a hypothesized relationship between the ratio β/γ and network division for that particular
arrangement of nodes. We can then use our hypothesized function to find what value of β/γ would
produce the network division observed. This same process is applied to all of the sessions for
which there is data.
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FIG. 1: Coevolution of opinions and networks, where individuals can adjust their opinions as well as their
network connections. Panels (a) and (b) show an example of cohesive community with consensus in opinion
(Parameters:α = .5, β = .5, γ = .7). Panels (c) and (d) show the formation of echo chambers (Parameters:
α = .5, β = .05, γ = .7).
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FIG. 2: Conditions for the emergence of echo chambers. (Parameters: α = .5, β = .7, γ = .05)
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FIG. 3: Inferred model parameters for given network division. Parameters: α = .5
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FIG. 4: Snapshots of House of Representatives networks generated using our model with inferred model
parameter values β and γ (α = .5).
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